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Shut up and calculate∗
Max Tegmark
Dept. of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139
I advocate an extreme “shut-up-and-calculate” approach to physics, where our external physical
reality is assumed to be purely mathematical. This brief essay motivates this “it’s all just equations”
assumption and discusses its implications.
What is the meaning of life, the universe and every-
thing? In the sci-fi spoof The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the
Galaxy, the answer was found to be 42; the hardest part
turned out to be finding the real question. Indeed, al-
though our inquisitive ancestors undoubtedly asked such
big questions, their search for a “theory of everything”
evolved as their knowledge grew. As the ancient Greeks
replaced myth-based explanations with mechanistic mod-
els of the solar system, their emphasis shifted from asking
“why” to asking “how”.
Since then, the scope of our questioning has dwindled
in some areas and mushroomed in others. Some ques-
tions were abandoned as naive or misguided, such as ex-
plaining the sizes of planetary orbits from first principles,
which was popular during the Renaissance. The same
may happen to currently trendy pursuits like predict-
ing the amount of dark energy in the cosmos, if it turns
out that the amount in our neighbourhood is a historical
accident. Yet our ability to answer other questions has
surpassed earlier generations’ wildest expectations: New-
ton would have been amazed to know that we would one
day measure the age of our universe to an accuracy of 1
per cent, and comprehend the microworld well enough to
make an iPhone.
Mathematics has played a striking role in these suc-
cesses. The idea that our universe is in some sense math-
ematical goes back at least to the Pythagoreans of an-
cient Greece, and has spawned centuries of discussion
among physicists and philosophers. In the 17th century,
Galileo famously stated that the universe is a “grand
book” written in the language of mathematics. More
recently, the physics Nobel laureate Eugene Wigner ar-
gued in the 1960s that “the unreasonable effectiveness of
mathematics in the natural sciences” demanded an ex-
planation.
Here, I will push this idea to its extreme and argue that
our universe is not just described by mathematics — it is
mathematics. While this hypothesis might sound rather
abstract and far-fetched, it makes startling predictions
about the structure of the universe that could be testable
by observations. It should also be useful in narrowing
down what an ultimate theory of everything can look
like.
∗This is the “director’s cut” version of the September 15 2007 New
Scientist cover story. The “full strength” version is the much longer
article [1], which includes references.
The foundation of my argument is the assumption that
there exists an external physical reality independent of us
humans. This is not too controversial: I would guess that
the majority of physicists favour this long-standing idea,
though it is still debated. Metaphysical solipsists reject
it flat out, and supporters of the so-called Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics may reject it on the
grounds that there is no reality without observation (New
Scientist, 23 June, p 30). Assuming an external reality
exists, physics theories aim to describe how it works. Our
most successful theories, such as general relativity and
quantum mechanics, describe only parts of this reality:
gravity, for instance, or the behaviour of subatomic parti-
cles. In contrast, the holy grail of theoretical physics is a
theory of everything — a complete description of reality.
My personal quest for this theory begins with an ex-
treme argument about what it is allowed to look like. If
we assume that reality exists independently of humans,
then for a description to be complete, it must also be
well-defined according to non-human entities — aliens or
supercomputers, say — that lack any understanding of
human concepts. Put differently, such a description must
be expressible in a form that is devoid of any human
baggage like “particle”, “observation” or other English
words.
In contrast, all physics theories that I have been
taught have two components: mathematical equations,
and words that explain how the equations are connected
to what we observe and intuitively understand. When
we derive the consequences of a theory, we introduce new
concepts — protons, molecules, stars — because they are
convenient. It is important to remember, however, that
it is we humans who create these concepts; in principle,
everything could be calculated without this baggage. For
example, a sufficiently powerful supercomputer could cal-
culate how the state of the universe evolves over time
without interpreting what is happening in human terms.
All of this raises the question: is it possible to find a
description of external reality that involves no baggage?
If so, such a description of objects in this external re-
ality and the relations between them would have to be
completely abstract, forcing any words or symbols to be
mere labels with no preconceived meanings whatsoever.
Instead, the only properties of these entities would be
those embodied by the relations between them.
This is where mathematics comes in. To a modern lo-
gician, a mathematical structure is precisely this: a set of
abstract entities with relations between them. Take the
integers, for instance, or geometric objects like the do-
2decahedron, a favourite of the Pythagoreans. This is in
stark contrast to the way most of us first perceive math-
ematics — either as a sadistic form of punishment, or as
a bag of tricks for manipulating numbers. Like physics,
mathematics has evolved to ask broader questions.
Modern mathematics is the formal study of structures
that can be defined in a purely abstract way. Think of
mathematical symbols as mere labels without intrinsic
meaning. It doesn’t matter whether you write “two plus
two equals four”, “2 + 2 = 4” or “dos mas dos igual a
cuatro”. The notation used to denote the entities and the
relations is irrelevant; the only properties of integers are
those embodied by the relations between them. That is,
we don’t invent mathematical structures — we discover
them, and invent only the notation for describing them.
So here is the crux of my argument. If you believe
in an external reality independent of humans, then you
must also believe in what I call the mathematical uni-
verse hypothesis: that our physical reality is a mathe-
matical structure. In other words, we all live in a gigantic
mathematical object — one that is more elaborate than a
dodecahedron, and probably also more complex than ob-
jects with intimidating names like Calabi-Yau manifolds,
tensor bundles and Hilbert spaces, which appear in to-
day’s most advanced theories. Everything in our world
is purely mathematical — including you.
If that is true, then the theory of everything must be
purely abstract and mathematical. Although we do not
yet know what the theory would look like, particle physics
and cosmology have reached a point where all measure-
ments ever made can be explained, at least in principle,
with equations that fit on a few pages and involve merely
32 unexplained numerical constants (Physical Review D,
vol 73, 023505). So it seems possible that the correct
theory of everything could even turn out to be simple
enough to describe with equations that fit on a T-shirt.
Before discussing whether the mathematical universe
hypothesis is correct, however, there is a more urgent
question: what does it actually mean? To understand
this, it helps to distinguish between two ways of viewing
our external physical reality. One is the outside overview
of a physicist studying its mathematical structure, like
a bird surveying a landscape from high above; the other
is the inside view of an observer living in the world de-
scribed by the structure, like a frog living in the land-
scape surveyed by the bird.
One issue in relating these two perspectives involves
time. A mathematical structure is by definition an ab-
stract, immutable entity existing outside of space and
time. If the history of our universe were a movie, the
structure would correspond not to a single frame but to
the entire DVD. So from the bird’s perspective, trajec-
tories of objects moving in four-dimensional space-time
resemble a tangle of spaghetti. Where the frog sees
something moving with constant velocity, the bird sees
a straight strand of uncooked spaghetti. Where the frog
sees the moon orbit the Earth, the bird sees two inter-
twined spaghetti strands. To the frog, the world is de-
scribed by Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation. To
the bird, the world is the geometry of the pasta.
A further subtlety in relating the two perspectives in-
volves explaining how an observer could be purely math-
ematical. In this example, the frog itself must consist of
a thick bundle of pasta whose highly complex structure
corresponds to particles that store and process informa-
tion in a way that gives rise to the familiar sensation of
self-awareness.
Fine, so how do we test the mathematical universe
hypothesis? For a start, it predicts that further math-
ematical regularities remain to be discovered in nature.
Ever since Galileo promulgated the idea of a mathemat-
ical cosmos, there has been a steady progression of dis-
coveries in that vein, including the standard model of
particle physics, which captures striking mathematical
order in the microcosm of elementary particles and the
macrocosm of the early universe.
That’s not all, however. The hypothesis also makes a
more dramatic prediction: the existence of parallel uni-
verses. Many types of “multiverse” have been proposed
over the years, and it is useful to classify them into a four-
level hierarchy. The first three levels correspond to non-
communicating parallel worlds within the same math-
ematical structure: level I simply means distant regions
from which light has not yet had time to reach us; level II
covers regions that are forever unreachable because of the
cosmological inflation of intervening space; and level III,
often called “many worlds”, involves non-communicating
parts of the so-called Hilbert space of quantum mechanics
into which the universe can “split” during certain quan-
tum events. Level IV refers to parallel worlds in distinct
mathematical structures, which may have fundamentally
different laws of physics.
Today’s best estimates suggest that we need a huge
amount of information, perhaps a Googol (10100) bits,
to fully describe our frog’s view of the observable uni-
verse, down to the positions of every star and grain of
sand. Most physicists hope for a theory of everything
that is much simpler than this and can be specified in
few enough bits to fit in a book, if not on a T-shirt.
The mathematical universe hypothesis implies that such
a simple theory must predict a multiverse. Why? Be-
cause this theory is by definition a complete description
of reality: if it lacks enough bits to completely specify our
universe, then it must instead describe all possible com-
binations of stars, sand grains and such — so that the
extra bits that describe our universe simply encode which
universe we are in, like a multiversal telephone number.
In this way, describing a multiverse can be simpler than
describing a single universe.
Pushed to its extreme, the mathematical universe hy-
pothesis implies the level-IV multiverse, which includes
all the other levels within it. If there is a particular math-
ematical structure that is our universe, and its properties
correspond to our physical laws, then each mathemati-
cal structure with different properties is its own universe
with different laws. Indeed, the level-IV multiverse is
3compulsory, since mathematical structures are not “cre-
ated” and don’t exist “somewhere” — they just exist.
Stephen Hawking once asked, “What is it that breathes
fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to
describe?” In the case of the mathematical cosmos, there
is no fire-breathing required, since the point is not that
a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that
it is a universe.
The existence of the level-IV multiverse also answers a
confounding question emphasised by the physicist John
Wheeler: even if we found equations that describe our
universe perfectly, then why these particular equations,
not others? The answer is that the other equations gov-
ern parallel universes, and that our universe has these
particular equations because they are statistically likely,
given the distribution of mathematical structures that
can support observers like us.
It is crucial to ask whether parallel universes are within
the purview of science, or are merely speculation. Paral-
lel universes are not a theory in themselves, but rather a
prediction made by certain theories. For a theory to be
falsifiable, we need not be able to observe and test all its
predictions, merely at least one of them. General relativ-
ity, for instance, has successfully predicted many things
that we can observe, such as gravitational lensing, so we
also take seriously its predictions for things we cannot,
like the internal structure of black holes.
So here’s a testable prediction of the mathematical uni-
verse hypothesis: if we exist in many parallel universes,
then we should expect to find ourselves in a typical one.
Suppose we succeed in computing the probability distri-
bution for some quantity, say the dark energy density or
the dimensionality of space, measured by a typical ob-
server in the part of the multiverse where this quantity
is defined. If we find that this distribution makes the
value measured in our own universe highly atypical, it
would rule out the multiverse, and hence the mathemat-
ical universe hypothesis. Although we are still far from
understanding the requirements for life, we could start
testing the multiverse prediction by assessing how typical
our universe is as regards dark matter, dark energy and
neutrinos, because these substances affect only better un-
derstood processes like galaxy formation. This prediction
has passed the first of such tests, because the abundance
of these substances has been measured to be rather typi-
cal of what you might measure from a random galaxy in
a multiverse. However, more accurate calculations and
measurements might still rule out such a multiverse.
Ultimately, why should we believe the mathematical
universe hypothesis? Perhaps the most compelling ob-
jection is that it feels counter-intuitive and disturbing.
I personally dismiss this as a failure to appreciate Dar-
winian evolution. Evolution endowed us with intuition
only for those aspects of physics that had survival value
for our distant ancestors, such as the parabolic trajec-
tories of flying rocks. Darwin’s theory thus makes the
testable prediction that whenever we look beyond the
human scale, our evolved intuition should break down.
We have repeatedly tested this prediction, and the re-
sults overwhelmingly support it: our intuition breaks
down at high speeds, where time slows down; on small
scales, where particles can be in two places at once; and
at high temperatures, where colliding particles change
identity. To me, an electron colliding with a positron and
turning into a Z-boson feels about as intuitive as two col-
liding cars turning into a cruise ship. The point is that if
we dismiss seemingly weird theories out of hand, we risk
dismissing the correct theory of everything, whatever it
may turn out to be.
If the mathematical universe hypothesis is true, then it
is great news for science, allowing the possibility that an
elegant unification of physics and mathematics will one
day allow us to understand reality more deeply than most
dreamed possible. Indeed, I think the mathematical cos-
mos with its multiverse is the best theory of everything
that we could hope for, because it would mean that no
aspect of reality is off-limits from our scientific quest to
uncover regularities and make quantitative predictions.
However, it would also shift the ultimate question
about the universe once again. We would abandon as
misguided the question of which particular mathemati-
cal equations describe all of reality, and instead ask how
to compute the frog’s view of the universe — our ob-
servations — from the bird’s view. That would deter-
mine whether we have uncovered the true structure of
our universe, and help us figure out which corner of the
mathematical cosmos is our home.
[1] M Tegmark 2007, “The Mathematical Universe”, arXiv
0704.0646 [gr-qc], submitted to Foundations of Physics
